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by John Booth
In this second article on informers, Dr Booth considers whether, 
in the light of recent reports, their immunity from discovery may 
not be in the public interest and whether or not the common law 
precedents which endorse that immunity are as safe in law as 
claimed.
John Booth
The Informant Working Group was constituted by the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) on 5 August 1997. Its terms of reference were 'to review the guidelines 
associated with informants' and 'to consider how community/social 
impact might be incorporated in the risk assessment applied to the use of 
individuals'. The Group's report, Informing: the Community 
(published in 1998) was a multi-agency publication supported 
by the MPS, the Police Complaints Authority and the 
Community Police Consultative Groups in the Metropolitan 
Police District, and, in brief, its recommendations stressed a 
need to re-organise the managing of informers and to consider 
risks in relation to the harm to the informant, police and the 
community.
A leaked list of some 50,000 informers, reported and 
published by The Observer (11 October 1998) and the Guardian 
(12 October 1998), indicated the scale of management required 
and the need to know the authority (statutory or otherwise) 
under which informants are controlled and accounted for.
The report stated that the informant is 'an essential element of 
policing' and that their use by the police has been 'since time 
immemorial'. The authority for the immunity of informers was 
merely that they were 'entitled to expect anonymity'. Whilst 
Customs and Excise and the inland Revenue derive their 
authority to control informers from the Inland Revenue Regulation 
Act 1890 and the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979, the 
police authority is from a Home Office circular (Crime and 
Kindred Matters, HO 212/1969 (1986)). Regarding rewards, this 
circular states that:
'payments to informants from public funds should be supervised by 
a senior officer'.
THE ORIGINS OF INFORMERS
The Informant Group's report referred to the authority for 
the use of informers as existing 'since time immemorial', 
although the authority for their use was documented in 1956 by 
Sir Leon Radzinowicz in A History of English Criminal Law, Vol 2,
which showed that common informers had existed from 1575 
until 1951 (Common Informers Acts 1575 and 1951).
The early acts provided for rewards to informers by statute 
and, for a successful prosecution for a felony, a certificate was 
given with exemption from the onerous parish service; known as 
'Tyburn Tickets', they were frequently traded for cash. 
Radzinowicz regarded this as policing by the economics of laissez 
faire, and Eugene Oscapella, in A Study of Informers in England 
([1980] Crim ER) considered that:
'[informers were] used in the absence of police forces [and] 
survived the organised forces that might have replaced them'.
The social threat lies in the fact that the act of an informer is 
often one of malice, or to settle old scores, where the giving of 
unverified information is that which the receiver most wants to 
hear (so that both are complicitors with the certain protection of 
the courts from discovery).
However, the keeping of an earlier public peace by the 
economics of laissez faire had, by the end of the 18th century, 
degenerated into a system of policing through spies, or agents 
provocateurs providing fabricated evidence for rewards. The 
historical ignominy of informers is therefore real and justified, 
but Home Office guidelines reminded chief constables in 1986 
that:
'Informants, properly employed, are essential to criminal investigation 
[and] ought to be protected'
whilst
Wo member of a police force, and no public informant, should 
counsel, incite or procure the commission of a crime.'
Therefore, in view of the very real public concern in regard to 
the management of present-day informers, and the known 
ambiguities in the history of their management, it should be of 
public interest to test the existing authority for that 
management. The following section considers this issue.
INFORMERS AND THEIR IMMUNITY
A recommendation of the Informant Working Group that:
'the use of informants must be in accordance with a proper system of 
accountability'
and that their use should be justified within the terms of art. 
8 of the European Union Convention on Human Rights, is difficult to 
reconcile with the report's view that:
'their use and management must remain ... shroudedJrom public 
view. '
Indeed, in regard to both their immunity and rewards, if the 
courts do not determine the credibility of an informer and the 
validity of any statement, the influence of rewarding informers 
without providing a sanction against the false informer, is all 
pervasive   corrupting the informer and the informed alike. It 
is arguable that the sources for the precedents of immunity are 
of medieval origin and have no proven authenticity, with a 
consequence that the rulings handed down have become unsafe.
How did this come about? Paul O'Connor drew attention to 
these origins in The Privilege of Non-Disclosure and Informers ([1980] 
IJ, 15 NS) by quoting an obiter by Davitt P in A-G v Simpson 
([1959] IR 105, 112) which stated that, on evidence:
'The ground that its disclosure would be detrimental to the public 
interest appears to have originated in state trials and revenue 
prosecutions'.
The state trials became political show trials, as in the earliest 
quoted case of Bishop Atterbury ((1723) 16 St Tr 464). Atterbury 
was charged with treason under the Treason Act 1350 (although 
the indictment is not stated) and was denied access to 
information regarding the interception of his letters under the 
Post Office Act 1710 s. 40. The court stated that:
'It is inconsistent with public safety ...to suffer any further inquiry to 
be made ... into the warrants granted    for the stopping and opening 
of letters which should come or go by the post'.
Atterbury was convicted, hung, drawn, quartered and 
beheaded as 'an example to others not to offend in the like manner'.
The significance of this is that in the House of Lords, Lord 
Diplock LJ, in D v NSPCC [1977] 1 All ER 589, 595, whilst 
rejecting an appeal against allowing the disclosure of the name of 
a false informant, noted Lord Esher's view in Marks v Beyfus 
[1890] 25 QB 494,498, that the withholding of the identity of 
informers had already hardened into a ''rule of law'. It is this 
assertion which now calls for further study, because Lord Esher 
added, in regard to the disclosure of a name to show a prisoner's 
innocence, that:
'then one public policy is in conflict with another ... and that which 
says that an innocent man is not to be condemned ... must prevail'.
It was in Marks v Beyfus that the Director of Public Prosecutions 
relied on the precedents from A-G v Briant [1846] 153 ER 809, 
R v Watson (1817) 32 St Tr 692 and R v Hardy (1794) 24 St Tr 
604, in justifying his refusal to give the name of his informant. 
Briant was a Revenue case while Hardv and Watson were state 
trials.
In A-G v Briant it was judged that:
'the rule of public policy protects a witness Jrom being asked such 
questions as would disclose the informer'.
But had these precedents hardened into a rule of law? Before 
1846, the public policy of the political show trials was the 
unquestioned use of evidence which may have been fabricated, 
with protection of the identities of false informers and the 
provision of sinecures overseas (see, e.g. the case of the 
provocateur Oliver (Hansard 16 and 22 June 1825), in addition 
to the suspension of habeas corpus. It was part of the political 
system.
These policies were then directed against Corresponding 
Societies which were deemed to be plotting insurrection. The 
trials of Hardy, with those of Watt (R v Watt (1794) 23 St Tr 
1167), and Downie (R v Downie (1794) 24 St Tr 603), were the 
political show trials of the day and relied on fabricated evidence 
of informers. Watt and Downie were first tried, convicted and 
sentenced to be hung, drawn, quartered and beheaded, as in the 
earlier example of Atterbury.
TREASON ACT 1350: SUSPECT?
Why is this Act suspect? The clue is in the defending 
barrister's remarks in the Downie case concerning hiso
indictment, which was common to all four defendants. The act 
is written in Norman French and had been reprinted in 1763 
(O Ruffhead, Statutes at Large). Its use is odd because, from 
1695, all acts were required to be in the English language 
(Treason Act 1695). Cullen, the defending barrister, explained to 
Downie's jury that the statute, written in the French language, 
was flawed because of the consequence that:
'the life of every British subject prosecuted by the Crown for treason 
should continue to depend upon the critical construction of two obsolete 
French words'.
The two French words were 'compasser ou imaginer' (referring 
to the death of the King), and the clerk would have rendered 
these verbs as 'compass or imagine'. An English translation ol the 
statute exists alongside the French in the Statutes at Large of 
1763, but the translation, made for Henry VIII, never received 
parliamentary sanction and does not replace the French text. 
Additionally, the Treason Act 1350 is undated and Halsbury notes 
the duty of the Clerk of the Parliament to endorse on every 
statute after 1793 the title, date, month and year on which the 
royal assent was received (Halsbury's Laws, Vol.44, 4th edn 
(1983), para. 813). Finally, the trilingual (French, Latin and 
English) system for parliamentary recording ended in 1731, 
after which all proceedings were in English.
Some attempts were made to try to resolve the French/English 
translation of the statute through the use of interpretations made 
by Sir Edward Coke (1552 1634), but the latter (also in Norman 
French) have never been printed and the translations are claimed 
to be very inaccurate (Dictionary of National Biography, Vol XI 
(1887), p. 242). Sir William Holdsworth also claimed that:
'Coke's law and political theories were essentially medieval and 
therefore wholly illogical'. (A History of English Law, Vol V (1924), 
p. 480)
Ruffhead's Preface also noted 'very material mistakes' in the early 
statutes and that:
'the learned Reader will be able to determine for himself, and may adopt 
or reject the Marginal Alterations, as his better Judgment shall direct 
him'.(Statutes at Large (1786 1800), Preface, xxvi)
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The justification for Cullen's defence of Downie is that 
Downie was pardoned, although Watt, without counsel, was 
executed, but, as Hardy and Watson's trials were to follow, it is 
suggested that the latter's indictments were also unsafe, as were 
the precedents which have been used to assert the immunity 
from discovery of the identity of all subsequent informers.
TRACING THE IMMUNITY PRECEDENTS
In the first Atterbury case (1723), the reason for the immunity 
from discovery was in the motion that l it is inconsistent with public 
safety'. In the Hardy case (1794), Hardy's counsel Gibbs claimed 
that:
'... when a man 's credit is sifted by being asked whether he has ever 
told the same story to another person, and he says he has told it to a 
particular person, he is always asked who that particular person is ...'.
To which Eyre, LCJ responded that ''the channels 
of communication are not to be disclosed' and that:
'... there is such a rule, and that we have this day determined that 
such a rule exists'. ((1794) 24 St Tr 604, 809)
In the Watson case (1817), notwithstanding the fact that the 
informer, Castle, was discredited, Lord Ellenborouph extended
' ' ' o
the protection of the identity of informers, despite the acquittal, 
on the grounds that:
'There will be no safety in communicating the important intelligence ... 
If the channels of communication are to be revealed. ' ((1817) 32 St Tr 
692)
In the Briant case (1846), the rule was further extended by 
Lord Pollock CB who asserted that:
'... the rule of public policy, which protected witnesses from being asked 
such questions as would disclose the informer ... equally applies to 
questions which would disclose whether the witness is himself the 
informer.' ([1846] 153 ER 809)
The Beyfus case (1890) ruling was Lord Esher's view that the 
withholding of the identity of informers had already hardened 
into 'a rule of law', and that a prosecutor is entitled to:
'... refuse to disclose the names of persons from whom he has received 
information . .. (unless it) is necessary or desirable in order to show the 
prisoner's innocence'. ([1890] 25 QB 494, 498)
But these rulings are really tautological assertions, and some 
of the ambiguities emerged in the D v NSPCC case in the Court 
of Appeal (1976) and the House of Lords (1977). In the Court 
of Appeal Lord Scar man LJ, finding for the appellant, observed 
that if:
'... informers may invoke the public interest to protect their anonymity, 
the law may bejound to encourage a Star Chamber world alien to the 
English tradition'. ([1976] 2 All ER 993, 1007c).
Many considered it was unfortunate that in the House of 
Lords the finding was reversed, and in 1980 Oscapella noted in 
A Study of Informers in England that 'Sadly, the House of Lords ... 
chose not to follow Lord Scarman's advice'. However the ruling did 
include a qualification that:
'The categories of public interest are not closed and must alter from 
time to time ...as social conditions and social legislation develop ...' 
([1977] ALL ER 589, 590, 605B)
The difficulty in accepting the precedent which has been 
claimed in the D v NSPCC case is that it was a civil case being 
subsumed under the head of public policy of preserving from 
disclosure in a civil case the identity of informants when no 
certification of any public interest immunity was provided, and 
which Sir Richard Scott showed was a requirement in the Export 
of Defence Equipment Inquiry (1996 HC 115, III, Ch 10).
Sir Rupert Cross and Colin Tapper considered the ambiguities 
of the public interest immunity certificate (Cross on Evidence, 7th 
edn (1990) 471 472), noting that 'public interest immunity' was 
limited to claims 'on behalf of central government'. Also that 'the 
question is usually vented at the preliminary stage of discovery' from a 
certificate made by a minister and that the 'certificate should set out 
the precise grounds upon which immunity is claimed' for which the 
Crown Proceedings Act 1947, s. 28, places the responsibility with 
the courts.
FURTHER READING
See Issue 14, January 1999, for an earlier article by Dr Booth which 
examines the case of a false informer.
The need to examine the considerations 'where vital interests of 
state are affected' and then other 'less vital interests of state' were 
identified in Duncan v Cammell Laird Co Ltd ([1942] 1 All ER 587) 
concerning information about a submarine in time of war. But 
this restriction, Cross and Tapper noted,
'could hardly prevail once the campaign had been fought, or the 
design ... becomes common knowledge'.
Other documents were noted where a ministerial certificate is 
hardly necessary, such as Cabinet minutes or despatches from 
ambassadors, and that immunity may apply in the European 
Union 'in respect of the interests of organs of the Community'. 
Halsbury's Laws identifies other special grounds for resisting 
discovery as professional privilege, self-incrimination or 
statutory provisions, (Vol 13, 4th edn (1975), para. 7), but not 
the existence of a document (RSC Ord 77, r. 12(2)). It was also 
considered in the .Runciman Report in 1993 (Cm. 2263, para. 
53 4) that the framework for prosecution disclosures should be 
laid down in primary legislation.
All of these comments only serve as a reminder that the 'hard 
rule of law' claimed in regard to immunities from disclosure of 
sources of information is far from precise, and that the 
recommendation of the Informant Working Group that the 
management of informers should remain 'shrouded from public 
view' might only lead to further miscarriages of justice.
REWARDING INFORMERS
Although the Informant Working Group noted that a 'small 
number of informants receive modest payments', there were no 
recommendations as to this practice. However the Home Office 
guidelines do accept the policy and advise that payments to 
informants from public funds should be supervised by a senior 
officer, despite other police sources which consider that this 
practice 'increases the likelihood that the informer will 
manufacture information'. Nevertheless Halsbury's Laws also 
shows that a Crown Court may:
'... order the sheriff to pay such person such sum of money as seems 
to the court reasonable and sufficient to compensate him'. (Vol 11(2), 
4th edn (1990), para. 1525)
Additionally, in the 19th century, the police themselves shared 
rewards to informers paid by the Board of Inland Revenue from 
the proceeds of customs seizures and penalties (PRO MEPO 
7/134 and T 29/606), so the policies are of long standing.
The paradox is that there is no statutory authority for the 
police to pay (or receive) payments for information, whereas 
HM Customs and Excise and the Inland Revenue have had 
statutory authority since 1736 (Offences Against Customs and Excise 
Act). The present statutory authority for the Inland Revenue is 
from 1890 (Inland Revenue Regulation Act) and for Customs and 
Excise from 1979 (Customs and Excise Management Act); these acts 
provide that the Commissioners may, at their discretion, reward 
any person informing them of any offence against the Revenue. 
At the very least, if these ambiguous policies are to be continued 
for the police or Revenue departments, of paying informers 
from public funds, then it should be under a sole statutory 
authority and with clear accountability for those funds to 
Parliament.
THE FALSE INFORMANT
It is unfortunate that the earlier court rulings were unable too
distinguish between the genuine and the false informant, where 
both enjoyed the protection of immunity by the courts as if 
providing an equal service to the state, although the latter was 
committing perjury. Indeed, earlier Taxing Acts (1803 and 1806) 
provided penalties of transportation or the pillory for false 
claims of rewards, and the Consolidating Taxing Act of 1842 
recognised the offence of perjury, providing for:
'Persons giving false evidence, or swearing falsely, [to be] liable to 
the Penalties of Perjury'. (TA 1842 s. 180)
This tax penalty existed until repealed by the Perjury Act 1911. 
However, the Statutory Declarations Act 1835 provided that the 
'Treasury may substitute a declaration in lieu of an oath'. This was 
not repealed by the Perjury Act and could therefore still be used.
Other courts have expressed stronger views about the 
perjurer. Lord Goddard CJ claimed in Hargreaves v Bretherton 
([1959] 1 QB 45) that:
'they should be sentencedJbr the crime ... and by a criminal court'.
The problem of the false informant was addressed by the 
Criminal Law Revision Committee (1963 64 Cmnd 2465, para. 
24), which recommended a statutory law to deal with false 
evidence, similar to the Australian Crimes Act 1914. JUSTICE, in 
1973, also noted wrong decisions in civil and criminal courts 
through perjury 'committed without shame, and effective 
sanction' and that as 'the effectiveness of the law declines, the 
incidence of perjury is likely to increase'. One recommendation 
was that a judicial proceeding should include an administrative 
tribunal, making the Perjury Act far more effective.
Notwithstanding these positive recommendations to counter 
the increasing problem of the false informant, the anonymous 
false informant presents a deeper pit of deception for which 
there are fewer records. One such case did identify the 
consequences for an innocent appellant for whom there was no 
redress. In D v NSPCC ([1976] 2 All ER 993), Lord Denning MR,
in the Court of Appeal, outlined what was at stake when an 
NSPCC inspector responded to a telephone call about a baby on 
a pre-Christmas night. Following a distressing interview, the 
innocent mother had to consult a psychiatrist, who reported a 
'severe degree of clinical depression following the visit of the 
NSPCC'. The unsuccessful appeal to the House of Lords 
([1977] 1 All ER 589) protected the anonymity of the informant 
who pave false information.
o
In this case, because the information was telephoned, even 
had the caller been identified, there would have been no redress 
in tort (Stand and Deliver, } Booth, Waterside Press (1998), at 
p. 104). The case of another false tax informant was discussed in 
Amicus Curiae in an article entitled An Informer's tale (Issue 14, 
January 1999). The false and anonymous informer has always 
been, and remains, a serious social threat which another criminal 
law revision committee could again redress.
CONCLUSION
This article shows that the recent public concern over the 
managing of informers was justified, that this concern is not new 
and has been documented from the 18th century. The secrecy 
over the managing of informers stems from the immunity from 
the disclosure of their identities, which has been extended by the 
courts over the years from treason to civil cases. The causes of 
the secrecy surrounding informers stem from unsafe precedents 
with origins in obsolete and non-statutory medieval writings, 
which have been interpreted through tautological assertions 
without proof.
The rewarding of informers, whilst well-documented, is 
mainly hidden within departmental procedures and the thirty- 
year rule for public release. This authority should now be 
codified by legislation and made accountable to Parliament.
The most serious failings have been over the lack of control 
over the false informant. This control could be made more 
effective through legislation codifying the Statutory Declarations 
Act and the Perjury Act.
Finally, it has been shown that a multiplicity of differing 
authorities have been handed down by statutes and by the 
courts, from which each publicly-funded department has 
safeguarded their own interpretations. A single authority to 
manage all 'informers, and accountable to Parliament, is 
suggested to meet a clearly-identified need. TRS Allan (in Public 
Interest Immunity and Ministers' Responsibilities, [1993] Crim LR 
668) reminds us that:
'the essence of a free society [is] that a balance is struck between the 
security that is desirable to protect society as a whole and the safeguards 
that are necessary to ensure individual liberty. @
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